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"The ongoing debate on American grand strategy will benefit from recognizing both
the nature and the merits of the Obama grand strategy—as well as the challenges
and dilemmas therein."
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Does the United States have a grand strategy today? Does it have a coherent set of
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principles guiding its engagement with the world? These questions have been at the
center of recent debates on American foreign policy. In the wake of the president’s
widely panned speech at West Point late last month, critics have charged that the United
States lacks an overarching design in global affairs; that the country has become
rudderless in a stormy sea of international events.
The reality is somewhat different. The Obama administration does have a grand strategy
in the sense that there are fairly clear strategic principles that structure its conduct
overseas. Those principles revolve around the idea of maintaining American
international leadership and primacy, but doing so at lower costs and in ways that better
reflect the changing geography of global power. These concepts, moreover, are not
obviously wrong or quixotic—given the combination of challenges and constraints that
the country now faces, they actually make fairly good sense.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that
sensible strategies are not always successful
strategies, and the particular grand strategy that
the Obama administration has sought to pursue
also contains within it a set of key tensions,
challenges and dilemmas. These issues touch on
some of the fundamental challenges of the
grand-strategic endeavor—and they could prove
quite serious in the years ahead.
What Is Grand Strategy, Anyway?
Before discussing what U.S. grand strategy is today, it is useful to address what grand
strategy is in general.
As I explain in my recent book on the subject, a grand strategy is essentially an
integrated set of principles and priorities that give structure to a country’s statecraft. It
consists of a series of considered, interlocking judgments: about the nature of the global
environment, a country’s highest goals and interests within that environment, the
primary threats to those goals and interests, and the ways that finite resources can be
deployed accordingly. These judgments make up a sort of intellectual calculus that
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informs policy, the various concrete initiatives—diplomacy, foreign aid, the use of
force—through which states interact with the world. Put simply, a grand strategy is the
basic conceptual framework that helps nations navigate a complex and dangerous
international environment.
Having a grand strategy is, therefore, essential if states are to maintain focus and
discipline in their statecraft, and effectively use their power. Yet getting grand strategy
right is never an easy task. The very endeavor of grand strategy requires countries to
prioritize among competing challenges and opportunities, and to make painful decisions
about trade-offs between various goals and objectives. It forces officials to relate
short-term policies to long-term interests, and to both exploit and preserve the myriad
sources of national power. Moreover, they must do all of this in a constantly evolving
international environment, and amid the furies of domestic and bureaucratic politics at
home.
For these reasons, a grand strategy can never be a road map with all of the twists and
turns plotted out in advance, or a panacea that somehow wipes away the complexity of
the global arena. At best, a grand strategy is simply a collection of generally coherent
ideas about where a country seeks to go in the world and how it should seek to get there.
These ideas need to be firm and focused enough to keep American policy anchored amid
the geopolitical squalls, but also flexible enough to allow adaptation and even
improvisation in their implementation. Indeed, the ultimate test of a grand strategy is
not whether it provides seamless coherence and flawless performance in a country’s
foreign policy; it is whether it simply offers enough coherence and performance so that a
country can advance towards its highest objectives over time.
Understanding Obama’s Grand Strategy
So what is President Obama’s grand strategy today? Over the past several years, his
administration has gradually assembled a grand strategy based on three overarching
ideas, each of which is framed by one of the key geopolitical contexts in which American
foreign policy is now operating.
The first of these is the post–Cold War context. By virtually any standard, the post–Cold
War order has been extremely favorable to the United States. It’s an order that has been
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very stable and peaceful by any meaningful historical comparison. It’s an order in which
the democratic countries—particularly the United States—have enjoyed a clear
preponderance of power. It's also an order that has been very favorable to the further
advancement of free markets and democracy. In sum, the post–Cold War order is a
world in which the United States can live very comfortably and very advantageously.
And so, not surprisingly, the first principle of the Obama administration's grand
strategy has been to preserve that order by sustaining the American leadership and
primacy on which it rests.
This goal is hardly original to this administration—it dates back to the 1990s—but the
Obama team has embraced this objective, restating it more or less explicitly in every
major strategy document released since 2009. And that goal has been evident in policies
that are so longstanding and ingrained, that Americans often forget how significant they
truly are: maintaining the world’s strongest military as the backbone of the international
order; reaffirming alliance commitments and forward force deployments as a source of
global stability; opposing nuclear proliferation and other threats that could disrupt the
existing order; deepening the international economy through the pursuit of free-trade
agreements; and others. As Peter Feaver and other analysts have pointed out, all of
these policies reflect a commitment to preserving and extending a favorable
international system. This commitment represents the first and oldest principle of
America’s current grand strategy.
The second guiding principle of Obama’s grand strategy is newer, and it flows from a
different context—the post-Iraq context. By the time Obama took power in 2009, it was
becoming clear that the United States was in a position of significant strategic and
military overstretch, that the war in Iraq weakened U.S. power rather than
strengthening it, and that as the conflict in that country wound down, American military
spending was inevitably going to decline as well.
This context gave rise to a second grand-strategic principle—that the United States does
indeed need to sustain American global leadership, but that it also needs smarter,
cheaper and more prudent ways of exerting that leadership, particularly when the use of
force is involved. This means avoiding prolonged stability operations that the country
can no longer afford, and finding more discreet ways of applying force when it is
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required. It entails encouraging allies and partners to bear a greater share of the load
when military action does occur. Above all, it means erring on the side of caution rather
than activism in military affairs—or as the president and his aides have so pithily put it,
not doing the “stupid sh*t” that could turn into another Iraq and consume U.S. energies
for a decade.
The policy applications of this idea are easy to see. They include the reliance on drone
strikes as a primary and comparatively low-cost tool of counterterrorism, and the
emphasis on “leading from behind” and keeping a very light footprint in the Libyan
intervention of 2011. This idea is equally manifest in the administration’s deep and
continuing reluctance to get involved militarily in Syria, and it was made perfectly
explicit in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance—the main thrust of which was that
large-scale counterinsurgency and stability operations were out, and that restraint
would be the watchword of U.S. defense policy in the coming years. Obama’s grand
strategy emphasizes American leadership, in other words, but it emphasizes limited-
liability leadership as well.
It also stresses refocusing American engagement to reflect the changing global dynamics
of the present era. This third aspect of American grand strategy is framed against a third
geopolitical context, which is the dawning of the Asian century. The Asia-Pacific region
is likely to be the cockpit of global-security competition and economic growth in the
twenty-first century, and the rise of China in particular presents the greatest long-term
challenge for American foreign policy.
Obama’s grand strategy thus stresses the imperative of reorienting American strategy to
keep pace with these changes. The administration has sought to extract the United
States from its deep military entanglements in the Middle East and Southwest Asia—the
region that has consumed American energies over the past decade—and to devote
greater attention and resources to issues of greater long-term importance.
This was the rationale, for instance, behind the much-touted and now much-derided
Asia pivot. It has been the logic behind policies like the opening to Myanmar, plans to
station Marines in Darwin, the upgrading of security ties with countries such as the
Philippines, and others. Not least of all, it has been a powerful reason why this White
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House has shown so little desire to significantly prolong American involvement in Iraq
or Afghanistan, or to get immersed in another Middle Eastern war in Syria. If the
Asia-Pacific is the future, the thinking goes, the bogging oneself down in the Middle East
means getting stuck in the past. This is the third essential line of U.S. grand strategy
today.
To call these three principles a grand strategy, of course, is not to say that they explain
everything that the Obama administration has done, or that these ideas are flawlessly
correct or cohesive. What it means is that these principles have generally anchored the
administration’s thinking about big-picture global issues, that they cut across key
strategy documents and policy statements, they relate to one another in fairly coherent
ways, and their influence can be seen across a broad range of actual initiatives. That is
the essence of grand strategy—or at the very least, it indicates that there are grand-
strategic concepts guiding American actions.
Is It a Good Grand Strategy?
At a broad level of analysis, this set of strategic principles makes a great deal of sense.
It's undeniable that the post–Cold War order has been very good to the United States,
and that America should want to maintain that order well into the future. It’s certainly
correct to judge that the rise of China as a potential peer challenger is the most
significant strategic problem that Washington faces over the long term, and that if the
United States seeks to play the long game—which is what grand strategy is all
about—then its geographical priorities have to shift accordingly.
The Obama administration’s general emphasis on strategic restraint also has its
strengths. The administration was certainly accurate in assessing that there was a
degree of American strategic overstretch in 2008-2009, that avoiding huge mistakes is a
worthwhile objective in its own right, and that the costs of American engagement have
to be made bearable if that engagement is to be sustained over the long-term. Indeed,
given the downward trajectory of the American defense budget and other resource
limitations that the country currently faces, this emphasis on prudence seems quite
compelling. On the surface, then, Obama’s grand strategy seems altogether quite
reasonable.
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This is the upside of American grand strategy today—that there are grand-strategic
principles anchoring U.S. policy, and that those principles have a good deal to be said on
their behalf. The downside, however, is that grand strategies can be both reasonable and
problematic. And that, unfortunately, is certainly the case here.
Obama’s grand strategy may be plausible enough, but it also carries within it five
important problems and dilemmas. Some of these issues reflect the way that the strategy
has been implemented; some are inherent to the strategy itself; and some have to do
with factors that policy makers can’t fully control. Viewed collectively, however, these
five dilemmas raise some fairly serious questions about the prospects of American grand
strategy going forward.
No Rhetorical “Oomph”
The first dilemma, which was clearly apparent from the president’s West Point speech in
May, is that this strategy simply lacks rhetorical punch. Preserving the status quo and
avoiding big mistakes are worthy objectives, but there’s nothing stirring or sexy about
them. To put it another way, “Don’t do stupid sh*t” is not an inspiring rally cry.
This may seem like a minor quibble, or a problem that can easily be solved through
better rhetoric, but it is neither. All grand strategies rest on a foundation of domestic
support, and domestic support is easier to come by when presidents can describe their
strategies in terms that are intuitively appealing to Americans who don’t spend much
time thinking about foreign affairs. And all things being equal, strategies that can be
justified in terms of achieving some great goal or defeating some massive, overriding
danger tend to sell better than those that can’t.
This was something that the Clinton administration discovered when it was seeking to
devise a post–Cold War grand strategy in the 1990s, and it is something that the Obama
administration is learning at present. A risk-averse, status-quo-preserving grand
strategy is likely to be a rhetorically and politically punchless grand strategy, and this
constitutes a first key dilemma for American officials today.
Means and Ends
A second and even more difficult dilemma is that while the ends of American grand
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strategy are generally sound, the means simply may not be there anymore. In other
words, the objectives of preserving American primacy and sustaining the post–Cold War
order are valuable ones, but they are endangered by the climate of fiscal austerity in
which the country increasingly finds itself.
This dilemma stems from the fact that the goal of preserving the favorable post–Cold
War environment rests on having not just the world’s strongest military, but one that is
dramatically stronger than its rivals’ militaries, and one that is so strong that it can
shape events and maintain stability in regions around the world. That being the case, it
is difficult to avoid worrying about whether this aspect of U.S. strategy will continue to
be feasible if the defense budget remains on its current trajectory. Even existing budget
cuts are forcing shifts in the defense strategy outlined as recently as 2012, and they are
raising questions about whether there is any military substance to the Asia pivot. If the
cuts go deeper and subsequent rounds of sequestration hit, these problems will only
worsen, and the means-ends gap will continue to grow.
To be clear, the United States will not soon find itself in the position of having the
second-strongest military in the world; but it could discover that it has jeopardized the
margin of dominance that makes American grand strategy viable. Reconciling means
and ends is always a central dilemma of grand strategy, and it is one that is particularly
pronounced today.
Europe and the Pivot
The ends-means gap relates to a third dilemma, which has to do with the question of
how a less-tranquil European security environment may complicate the Asia pivot in the
years ahead. A central premise of the pivot—if an often-unstated one—was that Europe
was a basically stable and peaceful region, and that it could therefore be treated as a
relative economy of force by American planners. That premise, in turn, was based on the
notion that relations between the United States and Russia would remain fairly calm
and productive.
Needless to say, both of these judgments are becoming hard to sustain. It is impossible
to predict how events in Kiev and Moscow will unfold in the coming months and years,
but there is already an increased sense of insecurity hanging over Eastern Europe, and
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U.S.-Russian relations have become more explicitly competitive than at any time since
the Cold War. This does not mean that the United States will be going back to Cold
War-levels of military commitment to Europe, but it is already forcing American
officials to reconsider what level and form of commitment will be necessary to maintain
the climate of reassurance and stability that Washington has grown accustomed to
having on that continent.
To the extent that more resources and attention are needed—and they very well may
be—it will only become more difficult to square the imperatives of the Asia pivot with
the requirements of security and stability in other key regions. Grand strategy invariably
entails difficult tradeoffs across geographic priorities; in the current environment, those
tradeoffs may be getting even harder for American strategists to make.
Pivoting from Strength or Weakness?
The fourth key dilemma—and one that pertains chiefly to the Middle East—is that it
matters how the United States pivots from one theater to another. There is little
question that U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has been less productive than
many Americans hoped, or that reducing that involvement was and remains essential to
refocusing on the Asia-Pacific over the long term.
It is also true, however, that a pivot that consolidates existing gains is stronger than one
that undermines them by refocusing too quickly. And so one of the trickiest aspects of
the Obama grand strategy has been—and continues to be—balancing the need to reduce
military exposure in the Middle East with the need to do so in ways that do not convey
weakness or undercut progress made to date.
This was never going to be an easy balance to strike, but in implementing its grand
strategy, this administration has not struck it nearly as well as it might have. Looking
back at the Iraq drawdown (and the more recent unraveling of that country), or looking
at the Afghanistan drawdown today, it is hard to argue that this administration has
made—or even tried hard enough to make—those incremental investments that might
protect the stability that was gained along the way. And that is a real source of tension
within the Obama grand strategy, because if the United States exits the Middle East and
Southwest Asia in ways that encourage instability rather than stability, it will only
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undermine its own ability to be effective in other regions. Thriving in one theater means
getting out of another in relatively good order, which is a fourth dilemma of current
American strategy.
Overreach and Underreach
All of these issues tie into a fifth and final dilemma, which is that “underreach” can
ultimately be as dangerous as overreach. Grand strategy is about calibrating the use of
power—using it energetically enough to be effective, but not so hyperactively as to be
draining or self-defeating. The Obama administration is certainly attuned to the second
half of this challenge, for it clearly recognizes the value of strategic prudence, and it
understands that a period of erring on the side of discretion was probably warranted
after the experiences of the past decade.
What remains to be seen is whether it also recognizes that there is a danger in pulling
back too far. There is the danger of liquidating existing commitments too quickly, or of
becoming so hesitant to use force that allies and adversaries perceive weakness rather
than prudence. There is the danger that the consequences of nonintervention or
insufficient intervention in a place like Syria might eventually become worse than the
consequences of a more assertive policy. Above all, there is the broader danger that too
much retrenchment or caution could undermine the stability of the post–Cold War
system in which the United States has thrived and prospered.
There is, of course, no way of knowing in advance precisely where the crossover point
is—where the dangers of underreach exceed the dangers of overreach. But such a point
certainly does exist, and those charged with devising and implementing American grand
strategy would do well to keep this in mind.
Conclusion
No grand strategy is perfect, and the very undertaking of grand strategy involves
wrestling with the problems, challenges and tensions inherent to foreign policy. To its
credit, the Obama administration has crafted a set of grand-strategic principles that give
guidance to American policy, and that seem fairly reasonably, given Washington’s
international position and the particular challenges of the current situation.
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That grand strategy, however, is also rife with potent dilemmas, ranging from the
political to the geopolitical. Considered individually, each of these dilemmas has the
potential to be rather problematic; taken collectively, they raise real questions about
how well a grand strategy that seems plausible enough in theory will ultimately fare in
practice. How effective U.S. policy makers—in this administration and the next—will be
in managing these issues and answering that question remains to be seen. What is
certain is that the ongoing debate on American grand strategy will benefit from
recognizing both the nature and the merits of the Obama grand strategy—as well as the
challenges and dilemmas therein.
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